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Abstract:
Mad Money (Manchester University Press, 1998) is the completely rewritten and updated version
of Casino Capitalism (Blackwells, 1986).  It has been suggested--of both volumes--that there was no
theory underlying Strange's discussion of the international financial system in them.  This she argues in
this Working Paper is emphatically not the case,  Both volumes always implicitly, and often explicitly,
are underpinned by the dominant themes that are reflected in Strange's work since the publication of
'International Relations and International Economics: A Case of Mutual Neglect', International Affairs, 46
(2) 1970.  These themes are threefold: Firstly a need to privilege the politics of the international financial
system in the study of international relations; a discipline too long myopic in its focus on violent conflict
and war between states at the expense of all else. (ii) A need to go beyond liberal political and economic
theory and recognise the significance of 'structural power' in the international system.  (iii) A need to
recognise that 'the areas of significant ignorance' in our understanding of the role of the international
financial system in an era of technological revolution and globalisation are becoming greater rather than
smaller.  For Strange, the structural power of capital is not constant and, therefore, cannot be
accommodated in the logic of liberal economics.  Thus, using the dictionary definition of mad--erratic,
unpredictable, irrational behaviour, damaging not only to sufferers but also to others--we have, as she
puts it 'mad money'.
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This Working Paper was in preparation at the time of Susan Strange's untimely death.  It was the last
thing Susan wrote.  It was unfinished and uncorrected.  We publish it here 'as is'.  We do so because we
know how much Susan disapproved of anyone editing--indeed, tampering--with her work.  She was well
know for having told publishers that she would not accept copy editing by '22 year olds with a BA in
literary criticism' making a mess of her text!
At the time of her death Susan was a Senior Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and
Regionalisation and Professor of International Political Economy at the University of Warwick where she
had spent the last five years of her working life since returning to the UK from the European University
Institute, where she had also been Professor of International Political Economy.
In the course of her career she had also been the Obs rver Correspondent in Washington (and at 23,
perhaps the youngest ever White House Correspondent), a journalist at the Eco omist,  Senior Research
Fellow at Chatham House and for 10 years between 1978-88, the Montague Burton Professor of
International Relations at the London school of Economics and Political Science.
Amongst her other works were St ling and British Policy (OUP, 1971); States and Markets (Pinter,
1988); Rival States, Rival Firms with John Stopford (CUP, 1992) and The Retreat of the State, (CUP,
1996).  Susan was co-founder of the British International Studies Association, a President of the
American International Studies Association (an honour conferred on only one other n  American).  She
has left behind a generation of former graduate students who are now significant scholars and policy
makers in their own right the world over.  She left an impression on all those who were fortunate enough
to have spent time in her presence.  The idea of CSGR owes much to her inspiration. She is greatly
missed by all those at Warwick who knew her.
Richard Higgott, December 3 1998
1What Theory ?
The theory in Mad Money
"Although analysts readily admit that international trade and investment have important
implications for the distribution of wealth and power among nations, no similar agreement exists
regarding the significance of the international monetary system."
So Bob Gilpin began the fourth chapter of The P litical Economy of International Relations, titled
'International Monetary Matters'. He went on to say,
" A well-functioning monetary system is the crucial nexus of the
international economy...a prerequisite for a prosperous world
economy...
Money and financial flows now dwarf trade flows and have
become the most crucial links among national economies. The
efficiency and stability of the international monetary system,
therefore, are major factors in the international politicial
economy."
That was written more than a decade ago, in 1986. Gilpin argued that the enhanced role of the
international monetary system  constituted ' a virtual revolution in world politics'. It was a
revolution that almost no one else in international relations or even the international studies
business recognised or wrote about. A deafening silence followed Gilpin's clarion call.1 One
reason could have been that he did not distinguish clearly between the 'International monetary
                    
1 My own work, Casino Capitalism  (1986, reprinted 1997))
came out after Gilpin's big textbook. It evolved from earlier
work on the pound sterling (Strange, 1971) and on international
monetary and financial history in the 1960s (Strange, 1976). Its
basic assumptions were the same as Gilpin's. and it suggested
some proto-theoretical hypotheses about the causes and
consequences of Gilpin's 'virtual revolution'.
2system' that governed exchange rates between national currencies, and the 'international financial
system' that governed the creation, access to and trade in credit. Indeed, only five out of more
than fifty pages of the chapter focus on what I have called the 'financial structures' of political
economy. Since the public debate since the middle 1960s, and consequently the bulk of the
academic writing by economists and others, concentrated on the currency and exchange rate
issues and not on the organisation and management of credit, it was hardly surprising that those
five revolutionary pages got overlooked both by students and by Gilpin's colleagues in
international relations (Gilpin 1987 ;118-123).
(A glaring example of this bias was the earlier and influential work of Keohane and Nye,  Power
and Interdependence (1977). Although their comparative study of US-Canadian and US-
Australian relations claimed it was focussed on the two issue areas of money and oceans, the
definition of the money issue area was not only state-centric to a degree but also narrowly
confined to currency and exchange rate questions. There was nothing there about capital flows,
nor about the informal 'regime' governing the allocation of transnational credit.)
All the same, 12 years is a long time for a challenging pronouncement by an acknowledged leader
in an academic discipline like Gilpin to go unremarked. How can we explain this long neglect, this
long and deafening silence ?
The answer seems to me to lie in the basic assumptions underlying the study of international
relations, and in the related problematic that defines the discipline. The basic assumption is that
world politics - international relations - are conceptually different from national/ domestic politics,
and must therefore be studied separately, preferable in separate departments of universities, or in
separate courses of study. The assumption is taken directly from the international lawyers who
early on argued that international law was different from municipal law in that it was not sustained
by established political authority and stable institutions of juridical responsibility. It was fluid
where municipal law was much more static. Much of it was 'customary' law. The judgements of
international courts, unlike those of national courts, could not always be enforced. If this was not
3the result of a state of anarchy in world politics, it was certainly the result of the lack of an over-
arching political authority sustaining international law.
Today, it is true, this sharp distinction between international law and domestic law, an  ,
correspondingly, between international politics (including foreign policies) and domestic politics
 is being widely questioned (Keohane and Milner, 1996 ? ; Rosenau, 1997). The evidence of
overlap and of reciprocal influence is abundant. What is still generally lacking is any explanatory
theory for why this has happened ; coining unlovely terms like 'fragmegration' is no substitute for
theory (Rosenau, 1977).
Even more important in explaining the long neglect of the politics of the international financial
system in the IR literature is the central problematic accepted by the great majority of
contemporary scholars engaged in studying and teaching international relations/world politics.
 This central problematic is the prevalence of violent conflict and war between states. The
historical background to this choice is important ; the coincidence of mass slaughter in two world
wars and an academic interest in questions of war and peace highlighted the importance of
studying world politics. It also favoured the realists of the 1930s( E.H. Carr , Georg
Schwarzenberger, Frederick Schumann and others, mostly German refugees ) and the 1950s (
John Herz, Hans Morgenthau and - most of all perhaps, Ken Waltz) over the idealists of the
41920s.2
                    
2 Waltz' first and in the long run most influential work,
Man, the State and War  (1954) posed the basic question whether
wars were caused by human nature, by the character of states
claiming territorial sovereignty or by the system of states which
 ensured competition between them for power and wealth. As Waltz
concluded, 'war will be perpetually associated with the existence
of separate sovereign states ...there exists no consistent
reliable process of reconcliing the conflict of interest that
inevitable arise among similar units in conditions of anarchy'
(Waltz, 1954 ; 238).  His later book, Theory of International
Politics  (1979) did not alter his basic realist assumptions, nor
his essentially state-centric conception of world politics. (See
his 1993 interview by Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, RIS
July 1998 ; 371-386).
Search the booklists of standard IR courses today and the absence of any discussion at all of
international finance, how it works and is managed or mismanaged is striking. Check out the most
5used texts - Holsti, Waltz (1979), Ray (6th edition, 1995), Aron(1 73), Claude (1962), Bull
(1978). You will find in some of these texts appended chapters on transnational corporations,
environmental and ethical issues, adding secondary actors to the cast-list of the state-centric
system. You will not find analysis of the role of credit in the politics of the world market economy
nor even of the politics of inter-national financial relations.
Or search the extensive literature now devoted to theories of international relations. There is
nothing there about the international financial structure and how it may affect the power and
wealth of states. Yet there is the prime example of Japan, once perceived as the leader of a third
economic bloc, challenging both the United States and Europe for leadership. What else but
international finance accounts for the different perceptions of 1998 : Japan as the weak link in the
world market economy, dependent on support from the United States, its recovery from deep
financial disorder delayed by its own political institutions. In recent months, I have searched this
IR theory literature in vain for the slightest hint of concern about finance. There is none.3
                    
3 See, for example, Dyer and Mangasarian (eds) (1989) , The
study of international relations ; the state of the art  London,
Macmillan ; S, Smith (ed.) ( 1985), International Relations ;
British and American perspectives  Oxford, Blackwell ; S. Smith
and K. Booth (eds) ( 1995), Interrnational Relations Theory
Today, London, Polity ; Smith, S, Booth,K and Zalewski,M (eds)
(1996) International theory ; positivism and beyond  Cambridge
University Press ; Groom, J. and Light,M (eds.) (1994),
Contemporary international relations ; a guide to theory  London,
Pinter ; C. Brown,  International Relations theory ; new
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normative approaches  Hemel Hempstead, Harvester ; T. Knutsen,
(1992),  A history of international relations theory  Manchesteer
University Press  ; S.Guzzini, (1998), Realism in International
Relations and international political economy  London, Routledge.
Even the neo-gramscians and other critical theorists who are not usually inhibited when it comes
to criticising the capitalist system have had astonishingly little to say about the role of finance ,
and financial policy, in deciding the 'who benefits ? quest on at the heart of international political
economy.
If the myopia of international relations theorists is derived from their obsession with the
problematic of war and peace and conflict between states, the equal myopia of western political
theorists is derived from a similar obsession with values of political liberalism. Their current
literature focusses a great deal on the nature, extent and promotion of democracy and liberty.
Look in vain for any consideration of the structural power  in democratic states based on the
financial system which - as Polanyi clearly perceived - could directly affect both the international
political system  - the gold standard - and the relative influence of social classes over domestic
politics.
Other social scientists share the general myopia. David Landes, an historian of repute whose
recent book,(add title, 1997) made a comparative historical study of societies and their success
or failure in adopting or discovering new technologies. Much of the detail is fascinating. But the
key question of how innovations were financed, and whether access to credit was a deciding
factor is totally overlooked.  And a social theorist, Francis Fukuyama, identified the key variable
7in societies as the level of trust developed between its members (Fukuyama, 1996). High-trust
societies  owed their advantage to social capital developed over time. Low-trust societies ;lacking
such social capital were conversely handicapped. But he too fails to ask whether the society did
or did not develop the trust in the value and stability of money necessary between buyers and
sellers, debtors and creditors.
The neglect is the more astonishing because it is contradicted by the everyday experiences of
people. What is it that causes most conflict at every level of social int racti n , from the family,
to the village and the local sports club, up to the management of the city, the state or international
organizations ? It is the control of money - whether cash or credit. Who gets to spend it and under
what constraints. Is it you or I, wives ask, who manages the housekeeping budget, or who signs
for the social security cheque ?  In the sports club, is it the members, or the club secretary and
other paid employees, who decide between alternative uses of the fund  ? In national
governments, it is Finance ministries that try to control the spending of other departments, and
thus to determine the hierarchies within the national bureaucracy. It is they who govern if anyone
does the raising of revenue, the state's access to other peoples' money by borrowing, and the
discharge of debts. International institutions too experience their sharpest clashes over finance -
whence it comes and where it goes.
Are these not all highly political issues ? why then are writers on international politics or national
politics so perversely oblivious to them ?
The answer, as I have suggested elsewhere, is to be found in their narrow and constricting
understanding of what constitutes politics, and of how and by whom power is exercised within
society (Strange, 1996, Ch. 2 and Ch.3). If you start from the assumption that politics is what
politicians do, and that corporate politics or university politics don't count, you draw a restrictive
line around the questions to be asked and investigated. Similarly, if you start from the assumption
that power resides in resources, and overlook the kind of power derived from regimes or
structures of political economy, you again draw a restrictive line around the questions to be asked
8and the methodolology to be used in answering them. The conceptual wall that was built to define
the study of international relations has become a prison wall putting key questions like the politics
of the financial system off-limits in the study of international politics.
This is precisely what Kal Holsti has done in a brave attempt to get to grips with the problematic
of change in the international system ( Holsti, 1998). By defining that system as the way in which
states relate to each other and conduct their business, he is unable to explain change, although he
concedes that we live today in an era of profound change without having discovered a new way
of  seeing the world. He agrees with Ruggie that there is no consensus on what constitutes
change, nor how to identify it (Holsti, 1998; 1 -2 ; Ruggie, 1993; 140-144)
Peter Dombrowski is a writer who asserts the contrary : that  there is a consensus (Dombrowski,
1998). He concludes a long and exhaustive survey of the literature by writing, 'researchers have
reached a consensus on a number of key questions emerging from the increasing importance of
international finance within the global economy' (Dombrowski, : 24)  One is that though capital
mobility has greatly increased since the late 1960s, price and regulatory differentials still separate
national financial markets.  Second, the extent of regulatory or policy coordination between states
' has been  more limited than might be expected', so that despite liberalisation and deregulation,
significant regulatory differences remain. Lastly, there is 'some agreement' he finds, on the origins
and management of financial crises, the relationship between states and financial markets, the role
of finance in economic development and the interaction of financial markets and regulatory
change. And the growing literature on international finance, he notes, is cumulative. That is, it
slowly adds to our understanding of what is going on and why.
In fact, there is in reality wide disagreement on every one of these points. Some believe financial
crises - the 1997 Asian crises, for example - were self-inflicted by incompetent and short-sighted
national governments ; others blame the external factors and actors which brought hot money
flooding in and setting off financial bubbles that were bound to burst. Equally, there is
disagreement on how such crises should be managed ; whether rescue lifeboats are necessary
9because otherwise the repercussions of.say, Indonesian bank failures will spread the contagion
throughout the region and possibly to the whole world market economy.. And while the IMF and
most liberal economists see capital mobility in the system as enhancing competition and therefore
efficiency, others argue that it has not been in the interest of developing countries. They would
point to the two or three Asian countries that escaped the worst of the turmoil - China, Taiwan
and South Koreas  and find a common factor in their maintenance of exchange controls over
financial transactions with the rest of the world. 4
Hardly surprising, therefore, that the 'lessons' Dombrowski draws from his wide-ranging survey
are equally dubious. First, he ays the state is not in retreat. 'Even though globalized financial
markets now appear beyond the control of individual states, states have not declined in
significance.' They have just changed their role to a more permissive one and changed the way
they operate in the financial system. That seems to me to be a retreat before the power of markets
and financial operators. And if ever there was a description of the structural power of beliefs and
ideas in political economy, this is surely it. It was not the power of the US or the IMF that
persuaded France or Germany to privatise , to deregulate and to liberalise their financial markets.
It was structural change in the world market economy, the imperative of competition for market
shares and underlying change in the knowledge structure, reflected then in the power of the
financial structure.
Students will find his 4-page bibliography useful, even though it is heavily weighted toward
economists and US-published books and journals  and towards the international monetary system
rather than the financial system. Non-Americans- Cerny, Underhill, Corbridge and Strange -
however, get credit for their work. Germain's recent seminal book should be added, precisely
because it deals in historical perspective with the relations of state authority and financial markets
(Germain, 1997). These works suggest that the neglect of finance noted earlier has been more
marked in the US literature on international political economy than in the European. Perhaps the
                    
4 For the Asian perspective on the crisis, see Richard
Higgott, 'The Asian economic crisis ; a study in the politics of
resentment'. CSGR working paper 02/98, Warwick, March, 1998.
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prevailing ideology of liberal economics in America has something to do with this ?
In short, both of Dombrowski 's conclusions are complete rubbish. There is no consensus and no
clear cumulative lessons to be drawn from the work surveyed about the power of states and other
authorities in relation to financial markets.
Keynes, Bagehot and Soros
The most amazing omission in all this is the work of John Maynard Keynes. After all, it was
Keynes who developed the only coherent, rigorous and influential theory concerning the conduct
of financial markets. Hi  General Theory influenced generations of economists , and still does
despite the counter-influence of Friedman and Hayek (Keynes, 1936). In fact, the General Theory
is more of a sociological theory than a purely economic one, even though it argues in economic
terms and draws on empirical economic data. Keynes' target was not capitalism per se ; it was the
capitalists who ran the system. When financial markets collapsed and profits fell, these capitalists
lost their nerve. They lost their 'animal spirits' as Keynes put it. They went, suddenly and
disruptingly, from illogical optimism to deepest pessimistic gloom. Drunken sailors one minute
; terrified rabbits the next. Market opportunities beckoned, but were ignored. The only remedy
for the real economy was state intervention to restore demand and therefore economic growth.
Keynes' work had popular appeal partly because it drew on homely analogies familiar to most of
his readers. He explained the illogical behaviour of the markets by drawing an analogy with the
competitions run by newspapers in the 1930s to build circulation. Readers were shown pictures
of pretty girls. They were asked to pick the prettiest. But the winner was not the best objective
judge of beauty or sex-appeal. Nor was it the entry closest to others' judgment of the prettiest.
Rather, it was the entry reflecting what other entrants thought other entrants would put down.
This, Keynes said, was how financial markets behaved. They did not respond to objective truths,
nor to prevailing opinions about objective truth. They reacted to perceptions of how others
11
perceived the likely behaviour of the markets 5.
A nearly-forgotten elaboration of Keynes' analysis was the work of Hyman Minsky in his
'Financial Instability Hypothesis', written in the 1930s, reprinted in 1982 and rediscovered after
the 1987 stockmarket collapse.
" Prices of capital assets depend on current views of future profits flows and the current subjective
view placed upon the insurance embodied in money or quick cash ; these current views depend
 upon the expectations that are held about the future development of the economy." ( Strange,
1997 ;77).
                    
5 This was explained in Casino Capitalism , which also
discusses the criticism of the Oxford economist, S.H. Frankel and
the connection with Georg Simmel's philosophical analysis of the
role of money in society (Strange, 1997 , ;133 following ).The
previous chapter had also referred to the seminal work of Frank
Knight in distinguishing between actuarial risks which could be
calculated and business risks which were, essentially, bets in
the dark which often resulted in loss rather than profit to the
entrepreneur.
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A source which surely influenced Keynes' thinking but is also ignored in Dombrowski's survey is
that of Walter Bagehot, the longtime editor of The Ec nomist before the first world war and
author of Lombard Street (198? ). Bagehot closely observed the relations between state authority,
as exercised over banks in the City of London chiefly by the Bank of England and the House of
Commons. His comments on the fall of Overend Gurney in the aftermath of the American Civil
War and the reasons why the Bank of England allowed it to fall highlight the very similar difficult
choices faced by regulators today - including the Fed, the European central banks or the Bank of
Japan. To let a big bank fail threatens to destabilise the entire financial ma ket ; to rescue it,
enhances the moral hazard problem, encouraging others to think they can pursue profit at the
expense of security.
Bagehot's judgments were not always the conventional ones. These were that the swift rescue of
Barings in 1890 was necessary because Barings was not insolvent but merely illiquid and its failure
would have had major repercussions for the City and the whole world system of credit. Overend
Gurney, however was simply insolvent. It had lent too much and unwisely - even dishonestly and
there was no way it could have met its commmitments. But while not dissenting from this
fundamental point, Bagehot thought there was a bit more to the two cases than met the eye.
Baring's Argentine partners had been callously abandoned, sacrificed to City interests, and the
rescue had well served the latter's interest by reinforcing the existing structures of power in
London and increasing the Bank of England's control over the joint stock banks. Allowing
Overend Gurney to go down too was not a simple case of exercising regulatory discipline over
a bad bank. Overend Gurney was an inconvenient competitor for commercial business important
to the Bank of England ; letting it fail while supporting the rest of the system was not simply an
impartial regulatory act. In both cases, therefore, motivations were mixed ;preferences multiple
and complex.6
                    
6 See Cain and Hopkin, 1993, Volume 1 pp. 153 -160 on which
I have drawn heavily for this paragraph. Their study of the
changing role of the City of London in British domestic and
foreign policy, and the emergence of what they call the
'gentlemanly capitalists' in London as the driving force behind
British imperialism is a fine exercise in multidisciplinary
international political economy based on detailed and perceptive
use of historical material.
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Finally, I would direct Dombroski's myopic vision to the contribution of George Soros. Like
Bagehot, Soros is no professional academic but an observer of - and a successful player - in the
financial market game. But his analysis of why financial markets behave as they do  is actually
more profound and radical than Keynes'explanation. Soros claims that it is derived from his
studying with Karl Popper at the LSE in the 1950s; I would say it is much more based on direct
personal experience and reflection.
The basic concept he calls the 'reflexive principle'. This is what fundamentally distinguishes natural
from social science. In (most) natural science , theory is based on objective observation of the
subject matter, which remains unaware and unmoved by the research. The behaviour of variable
stars is a good example. But in social science, in Soros' estimation, a reflexive principle is at work,
whereby the object of the research - financial markets, say - reacts to the opinions expressed by
researchers and other observers ; while, conversely, the researchers react to the behaviour of the
markets. This cannot be properly described as objective science. An aspiration to scientific
objectivity, or at least impartiality between vested interests may still be desirable and achievable.
But a truly scientific result is not.Goodbye, social science, and the scientific study of society,
national or international. Welcome, the necessary and welcome practice of multidisciplinary social
studies including international studies.
 The implicit theories in Mad Money
Having briefly justified my preferred sources for the study of international finance, it is time to
explain why I think of Casino Capitalism, supplemented by Mad Money , as containing within
them important contributions to the neglected role of credit and finance in the international
political economy. They are rather more than analytical surveys of change in the world's system.
Perhaps they are a bit like those children's comic-book puzzles in which the reader had to try to
find the cat, the rabbit, the fox and the dog hidden in the foliage of a forest scene. A quick glance
may not reveal them. But they are still there for the careful observer.
14
Some of the theoretical implications of both books are already apparent in Casino Capi alism.
Mad Money, which takes the story on from  the mid-1980s, asks the question what changed and
what was still the same, and in answering adds further theoretical implications and conclusions.
One important one is that both political theory and economic theory have ignored the power of
technological change - and have impoverished and crippled all of social science in doing so. In
international political economy, the omission is particularly disabling, for technological change
, more than anything else, has driven change in the structures of power ( Stopford and
Strange,1991). It has certainly changed the financial structure, as explained in chapter 2 of Ma
Money ). And it has changed the production structure by shifting power over trade and
production from governments to firms. Because it is firms - including financial enterprises - who
have developed the new technologies, the knowledge structure (as described in States and
Markets) has also been changed . In the post war decades and for much of the Cold War,
technology was  led and directed by states . By the 1990s, it was led and directed from the private
sector - Microsoft, for example. Important for theory here is the tendency of technological change
to accelerate, and to spread more easily over economic and political space.
You will not find much about the technology factor either in political theory nor economic theory.
Both tend to take it for granted and to ignore the dynamism that produces ripples of change
throughout the world economy. What there is, comes from observers of science policy  (Freeman,
1991 ; 1995 ; Pavitt, 1982 in Giersch (ed) (refs in de la Mothe ) and from totally new directions.
For example, John de la Mothe and Gilles Paquet both of Universite d'Ottawa are e iting a new
series, published by Pinter, showing how science and technology are shaping the world economy.
Business schools and policy analysts are more aware of this than conventional social scientists.
The other thing that has changed from the earlier period is the involvement of organised crime in
the international financial system. Of course, there have always been criminal  active in financial
markets (Strange, 1998 ;134 ), some of them respected pillars of society.  Organised crime is
15
different. Large, rich transnational networks flushed with profits from the international trade in
drugs, arms and illegal immigrants emerged during the 1980s as big players in international
finance. Their operations were the basis for a boom in the business of money laundering -the
conversion of dirty money derived from crime into untraceable , legitimate investment funds.
Because organised crime has developed from mafias, especially the US and Italian mafias, it has
not functioned like other economic enterprises. Secrecy between its members has protected it
from state authority ( Paoli, 1997 ). The obligation not to bear witness against fellow-members
- the principle of omerta - protected the Sicilians against prosecution until in 1993 the Italian law
was changed, making membership a criminal offence (Strange 1998, 128).
The theoretical implication of the closer links between finance and crime, however, go deeper,
into the structures of power in the international political economy. Mad Money identifies three
structural features that not only allowed but encouraged these links. One was the strong demand
 for hallucinatory drugs in the rich countries. Second was the ready supply from poor ones -
Colombia, Burma, Afghanistan.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the developed countries had steadfastly
refused UNCTAD  pleas to apply the principles of agricultural support and protection that they
used at home to support and protect export crops produced by developing countries  Poor returns
for coffee, tobacco, sugar etc. compared with high returns from growing cannabis and opium and
processing the material for the eager market. And third was the amazingly permissive market for
transnational banking services, including the laundering of dirty money. Mad Money argues that
the ideational sources of the permissiveness lie in the ambivalence of capitalist systems toward the
'learned professions'. This permissiveness allowed bankers and accountants to share with priests
the privileges of client confidentiality. Banks and tax havens have exploited this privilege, and in
doing so have punched a big hole in the governance system of international finance.
Nor was it the only one. A major change, noted in Mad Mo ey, has been the change in the role
of banks, and the diffusion of financial service business to all sorts of new players. The business
of banking used to be what was called intermediation - that is the bank intermediated profitably
between the wish of savers to lend money profitably and the interest of borrowers to make use
16
of OPM ( Other People's Money ). Their profit was the price difference to the savers and the
borrowers. Liberalisation of financial markets going back to the Eurodollar story in the 1960 ,
increased competition between banks and cut profit margins. (Liberal economic theory fell into
the error that competition necessarily lowered prices to the customer. Not so in banking; it
induced bankers to take bigger risks (Strange 1998 ; ch. 8).
The policy implications of this change are far-reaching. They ave been denied by conventional
writers. Ethan Epstein, for example, wrote in the mid-1990s that the system was secure because
it was regulated both at the national level by central banks and other regulatory bodi s , and at
the international level by cooperative accords reached through the the Bank for International
Settlements in Basle, and the International Monetary Fund in Washington. But subsequent
research has revealed the fallacies in this comfortable belt-and-braces analysis ( Strange, 1998 ;
ch. 9). Globalisation of finance has poked big holes in national regulatory systems and bankers and
others have not been slow to use them. Everywhere, these systems have been eroded to the point
where they no longer deter nor control (Story and Walter, 1997). As for the international accords,
the evidence again suggests that they are no longer effective. The BIS in 1996 abandoned its
efforts to impose common capital- loan ratios on banks worldwide, deciding to leave the
consequent risk-management to the banks themselves to take care of (Strange, 1998, Ch .9).
The theoretical implications are even more far-reaching.
Economic and social theories of regulation make the assumption that regulation has a clear
purpose - to reduce pollution for example , or to protect consumers against monopoly pricing -
and that the market and its operators to be regulated are clearly defined ( Majone,, 1994 ?). These
assumptions no longer hold for financial services. Where banking used to be clearly defined and
its essence was intermediation of OPM, so that the banker was not himself risking capital, the
present competitive market for financial servi es , in which banks compete with non-banks, and
in which they are tempted to bet their own as well as their clients' money, is poorly defined. That,
essentially, is why the Basle rules were abandoned and the prudential role left to the managers of
banks themselves.
17
States' role in globalization
Perhaps least obvious of the theoretical implications of the two studies are those concerning the
role of states in the liberating the forces of globalization. A lot of the literature on globalization
has presented the power f states as being under threat from the forces of the market. The
alternative view, tenaciously held by realists in IR and some economists, is that the erosion of
state power has been exaggerated and that the changes encapsulated in the term globalization
have not been nearly so great as the opposing school asserts.
Although it was never explicitly stated, the resolution of this important disagreement lies in the
attention given in both my books to decisions and non-decisions. They are picked out for their
longer-term effects on the structures of the world economy.
Casino Capitalism chose just five decisions or non-decisions that seemed to have contributed to
the heightened volatility in financial and other markets that was the leitmotiv of the whole study.
They were, first, the refusal of Europeans to accept more equal burd n-sharing with the
Americans for the costs of Western defence and particularly NATO. Second and third were the
rich countries' refusal to undertake redistributive UN aid, and the decision to opt for case-by-case,
ad hoc treatment of sovereign debt ( Strange 1998 ; 5-6; Strange 1986 ; 31-58). Fourth, was the
failure to make and keep rules about subsidised export cr its ; and fifth was the British Labour
government's decision to reopen the City of London for international financial business.
These were all early postwar decisions. I added five more critical political choices taken in the
later period 1971-1985. Briefly, these were the US withdrawal from foreign exchange markets
in the mid-1970s ; the cynical pantomime ( as I called it) of continued discussion on international
monetary reform in the 1960s ; American refusal after the oil-price rise in 1973 to negotiate with
the oil-producing states ; and the stonewalling strategy chosen by Washington to deal with the
French-led Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in 1974. The only positive
key decision was the US response to bank failures - the Franklin National Bank and Bankhaus
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Herstatt, both in 1974.
Note that all these key decisions were decisions of state policymakers - mainly but not all,
American. That was also true of the key decisions picked out as important in Mad M ney. In
1987, the stockmarket crash in October of that year might have led the US authorities to reimpose
stricter rules on share dealing, insider trading, entry conditions etc. It did not. The light stayed
green for deregulation and liberalisation not just in the US but in competing markets in London,
Europe, Tokyo and the markets emerging in the developing world. Second, in 1988, there was
a positive decision on the regulation of banks. The BIS, led by the US and supported by Britain,
adopted to 8:1 capital-assets ratio. Third, came the decisions following the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the Soviet rule in central Europe. Germany unilaterally decided to reunite east
with west Germany but all the other decisions were negative. Fourth, was the reversal in 1996 of
the Basle Accord on capital-assets ratios, already referred to. Fifth, was the response of the US,
the IMF and the Group of Ten to the turmoil in Asian currency and investment markets in the
summer and autumn of 1997. Even when it meant rescuing insolvent banks in Mexico or in Asia,
the security of the system took precedence in policymaking over the principles of bank regulation.
In a nutshell, it was the governments of states - especially that of the  United States - that decided
in favour of deregulation and globalization. Sometimes pushed by market forces, they still had
freedom of choice, and by and large opted to give way, rather than resist. If this caused problems
for them later, it was their own doing, their choice.
We are back, therefore , with the old International Relations question of the national interest.
Looking after national interests is the responsibility of national governments. But who decides
what policies are in the national interest ? History gives us many examples of stat  choosing
policies supposedly in the national interest, but which in fact were chosen to serve the interests
of social, political or economic elites, and burdened society in general with high costs and risks
that could hardly be avoided.  What we have to ask, therefore, is whether, and how far,  the
decisions and non-decisions taken by the United States were really in the long-term interests of
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the American people or whether, and how far, they served the vested interests of Wall Street and
big business.
This is not a new question. History has many examples of national policies serving special
interests. The British government decision in the mid-nineteenth century, after the Indian Mutiny,
to take over government from the East India Company might be one example. This clearly served
the interests of British traders in India, opened new career possibilities in the army and civil
service for the younger sons of an expanding British middle class and added imperial glamour to
the monarchy - 'the brightest jewel in the imperial crown'. But the longer-run consequences for
the British economy and society generally were negative. The British education system was
shaped to produce young colonial adm nistrators , rather than the technologically trained industrial
managers produced in Germany (Corelli Barnett, Maurice Zinkin etc ). The Indian tail came to
wag the British dog, despite the subordination of Indian trade and production to British interests
and the extraction of gold to finance persistent payments deficits ( Kenwood and Lougheed, de
Cecco etc )
A comparable case  would be the French decision to annex Algeria  and to use it as a cheap way
of rewarding underpaid French army veterans with land taken from the locals - a policy first
practised systematically by the Romans.  Although special state and economic interests benefited,
the end result was the creation of the 'pieds noirs' - the settlers who bitterly resisted de Gaulle's
decision to give Algeria its independence, cutting the material and human losses to French society.
Another might be the American decision, first taken by Kennedy, to intervene with 'military
advisers' in Vietnam. Military and ideological interests were given priority in the name of
containment and the US national interest in resisting communism. But the cost and the 
involvement escalated under Johnson to the point where American society, seeing no national
interest worth pursuing, turned against the Vietnam war.
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And a more recent one might be Chancellor Kohl's unilateral decision on German unification after
1989. His decision found widespread popular support. But was it really in the longterm national
interest of west German citizens ? It was certainly very costly for west German taxpayers,
particularly when Kohl insisted against the advice of the central bank on an exchange rate of 1:1
between west and east German currencies. And who benefited ?  German ( d some foreign )
companies who were given protection and generous state subsidies to expand in the new Lander
; a miscellany of administrators, employed east German workers, west German academics and
others who climbed on the unification bandwagon. History and sentiment assured popular
support. But was it really a rational ch ice ?
One could go back through history collecting more of the same : the British rejection of autonomy
for the American colonies, the Spanish and Portuguese invasions of south America in search of
gold and silver, and many, many more. Moreover, ideas and ideologies - 'manifest destiny', 'the
white man's burden','la mission civilisatrice', 'the f nal triumph of socialism worldwide' - have often
served to veil the conflict between special and national interests. In the period covered by Mad
Money, the concealing ideology has been that of liberal economics and specifically, monetarism
and supply-side economic logic. The failures of Soviet planning and the successes of US
capitalism carried the message to the developing countries and then to the ex-socialist ones.
American Decline ?
It is hardly necessary, in view of the record since the mid-1980s, to reiterate the point that the
power of the US, far from declining as conventional American thinking had it in the 1980s, is
greater than ever , and that there is growing asymmetry between the structural power of US
decision making over the world economy ( and especially the financial system ) and that of other
states has greatly increased. The US is more powerful ; they are less powerful. The Retreat of the
State, therefore, is imposed on most national societies, but is self-imposed on US society. Joseph
Nye's notion of the 'soft power' of the United States in the world is not wrong, but still distorts
the truth, which is that there is nothing very soft about the way US administrations can take
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unilateral decisions affecting others, military or monetary, with immunity (Nye,1990) . Most of
such decisions, we have seen, have enhanced the power of market forces, increasing volatility and
uncertainty. But some have also been consciously system-preserving, imposing re-regulation
rather than deregulation, and undertaking new costs and responsibilities in the interests of  global
financial stability rather than simply the shorter term interests of the US economy and its
taxpayers.
This ambiguity in US policies towards the international financial system, - permissive in some
directions, re-regulatory in others - reflects in  miniature the continuing but ill-founded 
controversy over globalisation. Is it real or a myth ? The clear conclusion to be drawn from the
evidence in Mad Money is that globalisation is real. It can be exaggerated, but change there
undoubtedly  has been. State power , on the other hand, still exists and can be - and has been -
used to limit the local consequences of globalisation. The erosion of national controls over banks
 and non-banks (Strange ,1998 ; ch. 8) however, shows that this state power is increasingly shared
with markets, enterprises and non-state authorities (Strange, 1996).
But the evidence also shows the wide diversity of experience - for states and governments, for
enterprises and for social classes. The theoretical implication is clear : the earch for general
theories is a vain one. Social scientists - and especially economists - have always hoped to find
such general theories - theories of economic growth and development, theories of the business
cycle, theories of the firm, theories of inflation. A recent study in international political economy
by Jonathan Nitzan  has explained why such hopes were always vain and exposed the hollowness
of theoretical pretensions in economics (Nitzan, 1998 ). Nitzan argues that economists always left
the power of capital out the picture. It could not be accomodated in the logic of liberal economics
; and no agreed definition of what constituted capital was therefore possible among economists.
Without an agreed definition, no general theory could be found.  Nitzan, interestingly, draws
inspiration from Thorstein Veblen and Lewis Mumford, arguing that the power of capital is not
a constant. Rather, the differential power of capital (DPK) and variations in the rate of differential
accumulation (DA ) help explain the widening rich-poor gap in incomes and the progressively
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higher returns in the United States to financial business than to manufacturing or agriculture.
In their vain search for general theories, social scientists have for a long time put great faith in the
value of quantitative data. The more, the better. Both Casino Capitalism and Mad Money  poured
cold water on such hopes. The earlier work introduced the concept of the 'areas of significant
ignorance' developing in international finance. As capital became more and more mobile across
national jurisdictions, regulatory authorities had less and less reliable information about behaviour
in financial markets and about the effectiveness - or otherwise - of government fiscal and
monetary interventions. The evidence in Mad Money strongly suggests that the areas of significant
ignorance are even more extensive today than they were in the mid-1980s.
Bad Theory Misleads Policy
To sum up, the description of change in international finance does not merely show there is very
little good theory to discover. It shows that there is a lot of bad theory out there that continues
to dominate research agendas and teaching practices. Students should be warned against these bad
theories. They may choose to disregard the warnings for career reasons, or they may cling to them
in desperation as drowning men clutch at straws. In the United States especially, researchers are
told that you must find an hypothesis and proceed to test it against the available data ( K ohane
on research methods, 1990? ). This imperative derives from Karl Popper who defined a theory
as a proposition that could be falsified ( Popper, 197? ). The alternative approach to research -
generally ignored in contemporary social science - was that of Feyerabend. In Against Method,this
eccentric writer argued that all you needed for research was a good question. Forget theory. Ibn
Khaldun in North Africa in the 14th century would have agreed. His question was, simply, 'Why
and how are things as they are.'
Two examples of bad theory, leading to counterproductive policy decisions were , fir t, the
theories of declining US power  just mentioned ; and, second,  theories of the beneficent effects
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of capital mobility.
Belief in the decline of US power dominated American thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. Paul
Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) and a number of other works promoted the
idea that hegemonic power in the international system was fated to be temporary, either because
of military over-commitment ( Kennedy, Calleo ) or because of the economic burdens of
maintaining stability in the world trade and finance. Events reinforced academic interpret tion :
the Americans were shocked by the oil-price rise engineered by OPEC, by the fall of the Shah of
Iran, by the depreciation of the dollar, and the loss of export and manufacturing production share
to Japan .
But the policies adopted in accord with the theory were often - not always - counterproductive
and contrary to US longterm interests. 'Strategic' trade policies designed to promote US exports
and protect US industry from Asian competition meant adopting bullying tactics - as in the Super
301 programme - not only toward Japan but generally to Europeans, Latin Americans and other
allies. The Cold War had suppressed resentment. When it ended, the legitimacy of US structural
power was damaged.
The other example of bad theory leading to counterproductive policy is much more controversial.
The theory plays a central role in liberal economics. It holds that the market economy requires the
free , unobstructed movement of capital to achieve the efficient allocation of resources, from
which all will benefit. In the last decade, country after country has appeared to subscribe to that
belief by opening its economy to foreign capital. They did so not only because many of their
policymakers came to accept liberal economic theory, but pragmatically to gain and hold market
share with the help of foreign firms who brought access to capital, new technology and access to
rich-country markets (Stopford and Strange, 1991 ). And they did not always distinguish between
opening up to foreign investors in longterm production and foreign investors looking for short-
term speculative gains.
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The most coherent, radical attack on the theory is to be found in a recent 50-page UNDP
monograph by the British economist John Eatwell. He challenges the validity of every theoretical
claim made for the liberalisation of capital as being contrary to the experience of countries that
have obediently liberalised ( Eatwell, 1998 ). The clear conclusion is that theory has led to bad
policy. First, he says, theory argues that markets will efficiently allocate capital from capital rich-
economies to capital- poor ones. In fact, capital moves in the opposite direction, from poor
countries to rich ones. Second, liberalisation in theory would lower costs to borrowers. In fact,
the borrowers have paid and the lenders have profited. Third, the theory praised the market for
discovering derivatives and other devices for moderating risk. But in fact, the growth of
derivatives has created new systemic risks unforeseen in theory. Fourth, the more efficient
allocation of capital and other resources predicted by theory should have resulted in faster growth
and more investment. It has not. Fifth and last, theory promised that the discipline of market
forces would force states into policies that would promote both growth and stability. It has not
done so.
Eatwell points out that none of these theoretical claims were reflected in the Bretton Woods
agreement to maintain fixed exchange rates between national currencies. That was conditional on
national currencies becoming by the  late 1950s freely convertible with each other for current
account transactions, not for transactions on the capital account. Thus, it was assumed states
would keep exchange controls over capital coming in, and going out of the country. American
financial and business interests, however, had other ideas. They sought freedom to produce and
sell goods in Europe, and did not want exchange controls to stop them. The result was a revision
of Bretton Woods rules to allow convertibility - and therefore IMF help - for countries (like
Britain) with problems arising on the capital account as well as on the current account (Strange,
1976).
By comparing the theoretical claims with actual experience  over the last 2  or 3 decades, Eatwell
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arrives at the conclusion that the theory, far from producing greater efficiency and stability in the
world economy, has resulted in policies that greatly increased its fragility.  That fragility, he
suggests, is manifest in four ways. The liquidity crises - as in Asia - actually cut GNP, lose jobs
and choke food supplies. Second, higher risks in the market sectors increases the bias toward
short-term responses rather than productive longterm ones. Third, incr ased isks to states
produces a deflationary bias in policy making. And fourth, market operators aware of the fragility
of local currencies and markets, press for greater ease of exit - flexibility, which in effect relieves
them of the costs of their own risk-taking.
The two examples are enough to reiterate Cox's point that theory is always for someone. US
decline suited interests that wanted US power to be used to open Japan's domestic markets to
American compatition. Liberal economic theories about the beneficent effects of financial
liberalisation for developing as well as developed economies suited Wall Street and its associated
financial elites.
The Asian story also reinforces the contention that the pursuit of a general theory is futile. The
only common feature in Asia in 1997 was the fatal combination of external pressures on Asian
states to liberalise too fast and the weakness of state regulation and supervision of banks. Beyond
that, the experience of China and Taiwan was quite different from that of Indonesia or Thailand.
Explanatory theory should say why this was.
Eatwell concludes by asking the So What ? question  : If liberal theory has misled policymakers,
what is to be done to save the international financial system from the consequences ?  It is a
question neither economists nor other social scientists should ignore. They have a social
responsibility - the price of academic freedom - to enlighten, to explain and to prescribe if they
can.  Yet, although expectations of a bear market in shares, even of an ensuing decade of world
recession, have grown, there has been a curious absence of serious academic discussion of
measures that might be taken, even now, to avert  or to moderate the downturn. Yet a number
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of proposals have been made, independently of others. Some, like the Tobin tax on foreign
exchange transactions, have been debated. Others, like Soros' idea of a voluntary insurance fund
for international banks, have not. Such free and open discussion can only be arranged by
academics  - national and international officials and market operators both have too many interests
and prejudices to protect. And although academic debate by itself rarely changes the basic ideas
- whether pro-market of pro-state - that at any time dominate  the knowledge structure, academic
debate when it takes place against a background of growing disillusion, of doubt and uncertainty
can act as a catalyst to action.
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